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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
J. ROYAL ANDREASEN and ALTA
N. ANDREASEN,
Plaintiffs and Respondents

Case
No. 8769

vs
GEORGE H. HANSEN and FLORENCE HANSEN,
Defendants and Appellants

PETITION FOR A REHEARING AND BRIEF IN
SUPPORT THEREOF
Come now the plaintiffs and respondents in the
above entitled action and respectfully petition the court
to grant a rehearing for the reasons and upon the ground
that in its opinion heretofore written the court erred in
the following particulars:
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS STATEMENT OF THE F AC'TS
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AND ITS APPRAISAL OF THE EVIDENCE GENERALLY
AND IN MANY MATERIAL PARTICULARS.
POINT II
·THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS
AND RESPONDENTS HAD ELECTED TO RETAIN THE
EARNEST MONEY PAID AS LIQUIDATED AND AGREED
DAMAGES.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE JUDGMENT
SINCE IN SO DOING IT REVERSED THE TRIAL COURT'S
JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE IN PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
POINT IV
IF LOSS OF AN ADVANTAGEOUS BARGAIN IS NO
LONGER A PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR
BREACH OF A CONTRACT TO PURCHASE REAL ESTATE,
THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL
TO CORRECTLY ASSESS DAMAGES UNDER A CORRECT
MEASURE AS SET OUT BY THIS COURT.

I, the undersigned attorney for the plaintiffs and
respondents herein, certify that in 1ny opinion there is
merit to the foregoing claiin and that the court cmnmitted
errors in the particulars above specified.

JOHN H. ALLEN
.Attorney for Plaintiffs and
Respondents

1020 Kearns Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah
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POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
AND ITS APPRAISAL OF THE EVIDENCE GENERALLY
AND IN MANY MATERIAL PARTICULARS.

In reviewing the findings and judgment of the trial
court the Supreme Court is obligated to view the evidence and every inference and intendment fairly arising
therefrom in a light most favorable to the party prevaling in the court below, Buehner Block Co. v. Glezos,
6 Utah 2d 226, 310 P2d 517, Parrish v. Taht.aras, 7 Utah
2d 87, 318 P2d 642, Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, 1 Utah 2d 9,
261 P2d 927, and it i~ presurned that the facts support
the findings of the trial court, and that the findings support the judgment. Larsen v. J}ladsen, 87 Utah 48, 48 P2d
429. See also Bartholomew v. Pickett 51 Utah 312, 170
P 65. The reasons for giving such weight to the findings
and judgment of the trial court are effectively set out
by this court in Nokes v. Continental Mining and Nlillin!J
Company 6 Utah 2d 177, 308 P2d 954, 955:
The rule just stated is based upon the sound
reasoning that some credit should be indulged in
favor of the findings of the trial court because
of the advantages peculiar to his position in immediate contact with the trial. It is indeed often
true that "the 1natter has more eloquence than
naked words portend." There are intangibles of
expression and attitude which give color and
meaning not apparent from words alone. The
judge feels the impact of the personalities of the
parties and the witnesses: He is able to observe
their appearances and behavior; their forthright-
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ness or hesitancy in answering; their frankness
and candor, or lack of it. Similarly revealing to
him are indications of surprise, anger, resentment or vindictiveness, pleasure or other emotions
which may be discerned from expressions of their
countenance or voice. He also has some advantage in appraising their abilities to understand
and their capacities to remember. Furthermore,
he is in a position to question the witness himself
to clarify doubtful points or verify his impressions on the matters just mentioned. All of this
combines to afford him better insight as to the
truthfulness of the testimony offered than does
a perusal of the cold record. It is a sound and
well-recognized policy of the law to repose some
confidence in the verity of the actions of the trial
court, and not to interfere with them unless ·it
clearly appears that he is in error. (Emphasis
Added)
The trial court in the instant case made the following
findings of fact :
1. On or about January 30, 1956 the defendants George H. Hansen and Florence Hansen
entered into a written contract whereby the defendant~. George H. Hansen and Florence Hansen,
unconditionally agreed to purchase of the plaintiff:-; a certain piece of real property known as
1233-1~;~;) Almneda AYenue, Salt Lake City, Utah,
and thr drfendauts entrrcd into said contract ·zcith
full knou·f~'d.flc of the terms of said contract.
:2. 1Vithout a n.11 jnstifi'ca.tion or e.rcuse the
defendants breached ,-.·aid contract and dz~d refuse
and fail to perform the terms of said contract.
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3. At all tvmes the pla:intiffs were ready,
willing, and able to perform said contract. Plaintiffs did not breach savd contract in any particular.
4. In making said contract the defendants
deposited the sum of $50.00 as earnest money with
Holt Realty Company. Plaintiff did not at .any
time agree or elect to accept or retain said earnest
money in lieu of damages. Plaintiffs' actual damages caused by the breach of the defendants are
grossly disproportionate to the amount of said
earnest nwney deposit, and said earnest money
deposit is grossly inadequate to compensate plaintiffs for losses proximately resulting from breach
of contract by the defendants.

5. After breach of said con tract by the defendants, the plaintiffs nuade diligent and reasonable efforts to resell said property and did find
.another buyer for said property, but only upon
terms less advantageous to the plantiffs than the
terms of the contract with the defendants, and by
reason of the defendants' breach of contract the
plazntiffs realized from the sale of s,aid property
$2,100.00 less than plaintiffs would have realized
under the terms of the contract with the defendants. Plaintiffs' dmnages in the sum of $2,100.00
consist of the following items:
(a) difference in the total sale price,
$1,000.00,
(b) value of refrigerator included with
second sale, $150.00,
(c) expense of real estate commission in
obtaining the second sale, $700.00, and
(d) the plaintiffs' time in obtaining the
new sale, $250.00.
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The second contract provides for interest at
the rate of 5Jf2 per cent per annum of the unpaid
balance in contrast to the provision for 6 per cent
interest per annum on the unpaid balance in the
contract with the defendants, but the court declines to award the plaintiffs any damage for loss
of interest.
6. The defendants agreed in said contract
with the plaintiffs to pay all expenses of enforcing said contract or the rights arising out of
breach thereof, including a reasonable attorney's
fee. Plaintiffs hired counsel to represent them
in the prosecution of this action and a reasonable
su1n to be awarded to the plaintiffs for attorney's
fees is the sum of $250.00. (Emphasis added)
Since the Supreme Court's n1ain opinion adopted the
evidence as alleged by the defendants, and went beyond
this evidence by discussing 1natters of which the defendants did not complain and of which they made no point
either in the court below or before this Court on appeal,
the plaintiffs feel that in their prior appearance before
the Supren1e Court they did not adequately bring to the
attention of the Court the fac.t that the trial court's
findings in favor of the plaintiffs were runply and thoroughly supported by the evidence, and feel it is therefore
IH'<'<'~~ar~· to review briefly son1e of the evidence supporting tlw findings in favor of the plaintiffs. Tlris evidence
~hould be viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiffs as the prevailing party below.
Plaintiffs' duplex "·as listed for sale with Holt Realty Company. Tr. 20-29, 21-1, 57-14, 57-25, 57-28, 58-1.
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Defendants saw an advertisement concerning the property and called a salesman, ~1:rs. Abbey, and arranged
for a showing early in the afternoon of January 29, 1956.
Tr. 21-4, 53-18, 56-26, 71-24. Defendants liked the property, were interested in buying it and spent an hour
thoroughly inspecting it. r:er. 21-19, 22-3, 72-4, 72-26
through 76-30, 40-17, 54-3, 112-17, 112-24, 113-2. They
observed the age and condition of the house and had
explained to then1 the personal property which went with
the house. Tr. 73-20, 74-4, 76-18, 151-28, 152-23. They declined an offer of the salesman to show them further
around the neighborhood, saying that they were acquainted with the area. Tr. 54-7, 22-3, 128-2. Defendants
were not "persuaded" to submit an offer of $15,000.00
and to make a deposit of $50.00 as indicated in this
Court's opinion. On the contrary, as Mrs. Abbey drove
them home, the Hansens expressed their desire to make
an offer to purchase the property. They were advised by
Mrs. Abbey as follows:
And Mr. Hansen said he would like to make
an offer on the house, and I suggested that they
think about it by taking them home and that I
would call them later in the afternoon that I
thought it was too quick to make up their minds.
Tr. 22-12.
Later that day the Hansens asked Mrs. Abbey to c01ne
to their home since they wanted to make an offer on the
property and could pay from $15,000.00 to $15,900.00.
Tr. 22-24, 45-1, 129-27. The Hansens suggested that the
offer be $15,500.00 and Mrs. Abbey rec01nmended that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8
they make the offer only $15,000.00. Tr. 22-27, 24-3, 2-!-15.
The earnest money agree1nent was therefore filled
out under the instructions and directions of the Hansens
and in their presence. The defendants thoroughly considered the terms of the offer item by item, read the
document, and signed it. In accepting the defendants'
claim that they did not understand the terms of the
contract, the Supreme Court has overlooked ample evidence to the contrary which the trial court heard and
believed. The Supreme Court's opinion considered the
defendants' testimony credible (unlike the trial court
which heard the testilnony) and recited that there was no
indication that the defendants understood the terms of
the contract and that every inference was to the contrary.
This statement is clearly contrary to the finding of
fact of the trial court which is as follows:
... The defendants entered into the contract
with full knowledge of the terms of said contract.
(Paragraph I Findings of Fact.)
This finding of the trial court is fully supported by
the evidence and is entitled to a presun1ption of correctness since the trial court had the opportunity of observing the demeanor of the defendants as witnesses and
making its decision as to the truthfulness of their testiInony.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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When preparing the offer, the terms of the contract
were discussed in detail between Mrs. Abbey and Mr.
and Mrs. Hansen and their daughter. Tr. 23-3, 25-3, 2622, 26-11, 161-5. Mrs. Abbey testified as follows:
I got the real estate contract out, and we went
over it, item by item, hot (sic) it was to be filled
in, each item you have to ask the customer everything, from how they wanted it, in joint tenancy,
the time they wanted to take to pay, how much did
they want to put down, how they wanted to pay
the rest of the balance of the money, their interest
rate, everything has to be discussed, item for item.
Tr. 24-17.

To further emphasize the unreasonableness of the
defendants' allegation that they misunderstood the meaning of the contract and that they thought it was simply
an offer and receipt for $50.00 and if they did not want
the property the $50.00 would be forfeited, and to emphasize the reasonableness of the trial court's findings
that defendants fully understood the contract, the record
shows that a short time prior to the signing of this
e~rnest money receipt and offer to purchase the Hansen8
had sold their own home in a similar transaction using
an earnest money receipt and offer to purchase, the
terms of which were also explained to them at that time.
Mr. Hansen testified in part:
Q. Were they to handle the transaction and
draw the papers on it~

A.

They did.
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Q. Did they present those papers to you?
A. They did.
Q. Did you sign then1?
A. I did.
Q. Did you read them before you signed
them with your realtor~
A. 1\ o, they were explained to me.

Q.
A.

You did not read then1 at all?
Ko. It \Yas explained to me that you-

Q. Just a minute. Just answer the question.
Did you sign an earnest rnoney receipt in connection 1cith your transaction?
A. Y cs. (Tr. 170-26 to 171-9) (Emphasis
added.)
Defendants were not "'high pressured" into this purchase,
as indicated by the Court's opinion, but admitted that
they entered into the contract willingly and that nothing
was 1nisrepresented to then1. ~Irs. Abbey testified as follows:
:Jf r. \Yebber asked then1 if there was anything
wrong with the house, and they said, •·x o," and

he

al~o

asked or said, "'Has

~Irs.

Abbey twisted

your ann, or in any Inanner Inisrepresented the
lion~(\'' and thPy ~aid, "'X o."
thP~1\f r~.

_.\nd ~hf' ~aid thf·~~ just didn't want the house,
guessed tl)(_~~- had bought it too quickly, Hansen said that.

She ~aid. "l guess we just bought it too quick!)·." Tr. 35-16.
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'"'[r. Andrea8en testified as follows, quoting his conversation with :Mrs. Hansen wLen she a.-;ked to cancel the
contract:

I said, "Is there anything the matter with the
house; did the agent misrepresent anything to
you~"

No, it was not that, we just can't take it."
"Well, why can't you~"
She said, "VVell, we are having smne family
trouble about it. We just decided we can't take it
and we would like to ·withdraw. Vlill you let us
mtt of it?" Tr. 80-18. (E1nphasis added)
Plaintiffs accepted the offer as Inade by the defendants,
and relying upon defendants' unconditional agreement
to purchase, informed other prospective purchasers that
the property had been sold, and inforn1ed other salesman
of this fact and advised them not to bring any Inore
people around to see the property. The listing agent,
Holt Realty, reported the property sold, and the listing
was withdrawn from the Multiple Listing Bureau.
After the offer was accepted the Hansens called the
plaintiffs and acknowledged that they had purchased the
property. Mrs. Alta Andreasen testified as follows:
A. Yes, After Mrs. Abbey and Mr. Webber
had left, some time, I don't remember how long
after, but later in the evening, the telephone rang
and I answered it. Mrs. Hansen identified herself
and she said, "I understand we have bottght your
house?" Emphasis added)
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I said, "Yes."
She said, "I would like to bring my daughter
up to see it, when could we come." Tr. 113-13.
This Court in its opinion inferred that plaintiffs
chose the form of contract on which this offer was to be
made and accepted, and held that because the defendants
n1isunderstood the contract that plaintiffs' agent had put
before them and because of the fine print of the option
clause, defendants were not bound thereby. This is not
only contrary to the findings of fact of the trial court,
but this Court has failed to consider the fact that the contract was made on a printed earnest money receipt and
offer to purchase, which was prepared by the Securities
Commission of the State of r tah, and approved by the
Attorney General of the State of rtah. Exhibit 1. This
is the only form which the law allows a real estate agent
to use and on which this transaction could have been
handled. Section 61-~-:W l-:-tah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows:
"lt i~ ex1n·p~sly provided that a real estate
sales1nan shall haYe the right to fill out and complete an C'anH'st 1noney receipt and agree1nent in
forms apJJrorcd by the commission and forms
providPd h~· statuh~ and that a real estate broker
shall havp the rig·ht to fill out and c01nplete forms
of legal doctunents nPressary to any real estate
1rm1~a<'i ion to whieh the said broker is a party as
principal or agPnt. aud 1rhich forms hare been ap}Jrorcd h.11 the Commission and the Attorney General of the State of Ctah.'' (En1phasis added)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
l~se

of any other form by the real estate salesman would

be considered the practice of law. Neither the plaintiffs,
the real estate agent, nor the defendants had anything
to do with the preparation of the printed wording of the
contract. The defendants made the offer on this form,
the blanks having been filled in according to Hansens'
instructions, tr. 27-14, and the trial court found that they
fully understood the terms of the

~ame.

11 he defendants

made no point of the fine print of the contract either
in the court below or before this court, nor did they object to the form of the printed contract in any manner.
In fact the defendants must have found it satisfactory
and been familiar with it since they had recently sold
their own home using the same printed contract. Tr.
170 and 171. This earnest money receipt and offer to
purchase, when accepted by the sellers, is a valid, unconditionally enforceable, and binding contract, conclusive and not contingent or executory in nature. Directly above the signatures of the defendants on the
contract appears the following:

We do hereby agree to carry out and fuJfill
the terms and conditions specified above, and the
seller agrees to furnish good and marketable title
with abstract to date or at sellers' option a policy
of title insurance in the name of the purchaser
and to make final conveyance by warranty deed
or ____________ ; in the event of sale of other than real
properties the seller will provide evidence of title
or right to sell or lease. If either party fails so to
do, he agrees to pay all e:rzJenses of enforcinu this
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agreement or of any rights anstng out of the
breach thereof including a reasonable attorney's
fee.

The seller agrees in consideration of the efforts of the agent in procuring a purchaser, to pay
said agent a commission equal to the minimum
recommended by the Salt Lake Real Estate Board.
In the event seller has entered into a listing contract with any other agent and said contract is
presently effective, this paragraph will be of no
force or effect. (Emphasis added)
The above italicized ·wording clearly contemplates
that a suit might properly be brought to (1) enforce the
agreement (specific performance), or (2) "enforce any
rights arising out of the breach thereof" (Legal damages).
Defendants did realize the binding nature of this
contract, as indicated by the trial court's findings and
they admitted that they were bound by the contract.
Sterling G. \Yebber of Holt Realty testified as follows:
A. I was introduced to the Hansens by :Jirs.
AbbeY, and we sat in the sales office there in
priY<{te, and I asked the1n what the problem
see1ned to be, and she said they just decided that
tlw~~ did not want to purchase the h01ne, and I
a~krd thPm Yer~- point blank if .Jirs. ~\bbey InisrPprp::-;rntPd an~·thing, or did she t"ist their arn1
in any \Ya:·. in getting the offer. \Ye like to ha\e
<'Y('r~·onp ha pp:· in t•n·r~- transaction we handled,
and t1H'\~ ~aid. "I\ o, sh<> did not." that there nerer
1f'as an,;, prc . .·sltrc of au.11 kind iHrolced, and I
a.sk<'d t hPm what theY wanted to do - what theY
·
want<'d 1ue to do. as ·a broker, in the thing.
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They savd they would like to get out of it if
they could. I said, "Well, I would have no authority to let thern out, but I would be happy to discuss
the matter with l\fr. Andreasen, and go over the
matter with him.

Q. Did Mr. Hansen say anything - any conversation with him 1
A. Yes, he said that he had purchased the
home and he knew he was bound on the thing, but
because his wife being so upset, that they would
like to get out from mtder purchasing it if they
could. Tr. 60-6. (Emphasis added)

The Supreme Court's opinion further infers that the
defendants were justified in breaching the contract. On
the contrary, the trial court specifically found as follows:
"Without any jusisdiction or excuse the defendants breached said contract and did refuse
and fail to perform the terms of said contract.
Paragraph 2, Findings of Fact.
The trial court further found:
"At all times the plaintiffs were ready, willing, and able to perform said contract. Plaintiffs
did not breach said contract in any particular."
Paragraph 3, Findings of Fact.
The record further shows that plaintiffs' agent Holt
Realty offered to assist the defendants in any way they
could and offered to help at no cost in disposing of the
property. Tr. 61-4, :Mrs. Abbey testified as follows:
"Mr. Webber said he would talk to Mr. Andreasen again. He also said if l\1 r. Andreason held
them to the contract, that he would list the house,
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or take it and sell it and try to get out, without
any commission so far as they were concerned, or
try and see they lost no money by it, or we would
rent it for them if they didn't wish to move into
it thernselves, while we are trying to work out the
problem for them." Tr. 35-23.
Plaintiffs did not sue "with vengeance'' as indicated
by this Court's opinion, but in fact made every effort
possible to try and encourage defendants to perform and
to try and get a better price on the second sale in order
to mitigate damages. Mr. Andreasen himself phoned
other people who had been around to see the property
in an effort to get a better price on the second sale.
The main opinion of the Supreme Court presented
the "facts" as unsuccessfully argued to the trial court
by the defendants. Such "facts" are contrary to the actual
facts as shown by the record and found by the trial court.
The trial court fully heard the defendants contentions
and disbelieved then1.
It appears therefore that the Supren1e Court's treatment of the evidence is clearly eontrary to the rules
previou~l~· ~takd by thit' court requiring the Supreme
1
( onrt
to n•viP\\" the evidence with e\ery inference and
i111PndrtH'1lt fairly arising therefrmn in favor of the
party pn•v<ding in the trial court.
A thorough reading of the transcript will reveal
amplP Pvidcner in support of plaintiffs' contentions and
ample Pvid<'lH'l' in support of the Findings and judgSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ment of the trial court. Plaintiffs were not required to
prove their facts conclusively, but were only required to
prove them by a preponderance of evidence, and such
a preponderance is contained in the record.
Contrary to the inference contained in the Supreme
Court's opinion the transcript reveals that it was the
sellers who throughout the entire transaction dealt in
strict good faith, as found by the trial court, and it is
they who are entitled to sympathy and not the defaulting
vendees whose unjustified actions injuriously affected
the sellers' rights.
The Supreme Court considered the trial court to
have acted under a misapprehension of the law regarding
damages. Even if this were so, it does not justify the
Supreme Court in overruling the findings of the trial
court on other issues where there was no misapprehension of the law, some of such issues being:
a. Defendants' full understanding of the nature
of the contract.
b. Plaintiffs' good faith in executing the contract,
tendering performance and mitigating damages.
c. Defendants' lack of justification for breaching
the contract.
d.

Credibility of witnesses.

e. The fact that plaintiff elected to ~uP for actual
damages rather than forfeiture of the earnest money.
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS
AND RESPONDENTS HAD ELECTED TO RETAIN THE
EARNEST MONEY PAID AS LIQUIDATED AND AGREED
DAMAGES.

The trial court specifically found as follows:
.. In Inaking said contract the defendants deposited the sum of $50.00 as earnest money with
Holt Realty Company. Plaintiffs did not at any
time agree or elect to accept or retain said earnest
money in lieu of danwges." Paragraph 4, Findings of Fact. (Emphasis added)
This finding is fully supported by the evidence and
there is no evidence to the contrary. The transcript contains supporting facts as follows:
The defendants entered into an unconditional contract to purchase real estate. Before the defendants
voiced any desire to withdraw from the contract the
sellers, relying on tlus unconditional contract, had
changed their position to their detriment by discouraging
other interested parties frmn viewing the property, by
infonning salesman not to bring others to look at the
proJwrt)-. Tr. 91-11. 91-:2:~. 92-13. and since the sale had
lwPn reported to the real estate board the listing was
withdrawn fr01n the ~fulitple Listing Bureau, Tr. 61-11,
Gl-16, (i.f-~7, G-l--2D, 65-6. Defendants thereafter announced
tht>ir dP~ir<> to withdraw fron1 the contract and suggested
that plaintiffs retain tlle earnest Inoney and relieve the
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defendants of their contractual obligation. The plaintiffs
clearly, specifically and repeatedly stated to the defendants that they would not release the defendants fron1
the obligation, that the earnest money was insufficient
to cover either the obligations already incurred by plaintiffs or the contemplated and possible future damages,
that the plaintiffs elected to hold the defendants to such
actual damages as might arise, and that they would not
accept or elect to allow the defendants to forfeit the
earnest money in lieu of damages. Mr. Andreasen testified as follows concerning a conversation with :Mr.
Hansen:
A. This was by telephone. I telephoned ~Ir.
Hansen from my office, and told him that the tin1e
was drawing near. I think it was Tuesday when
the deal was to be closed and the money paid, and
that I wanted to discuss it with him, since they
had raised this question as to whether they were
going to perform, and I asked him again what the
difficulty was, why he did not want to take it.
Well, his wife decided she did not want it. He
said that was the only reason. He said, uw e are
having trouble here irn the family about it, and we
would rather not take it." And he said, ''TVhy
don't you j1tst take the $50.00."
I told him, no, that would not begin to pay
for my damages, that the new commission alone
would be many times that much. I d£rl not know
what the new deal would be, with whal terms it
would be, and I might be able to get a better deal
or might have to take a worse one.
'
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I said I would not consider the $50.00 in settlement of the damages that it was entirely inadequate, and I explained to him to either perform
the contract, or I would hold him responsible for
whatever damages I suffered by his breach of
the contract." Tr. 82-3. (Emphasis added)
Mr. Andreasen further testified concerning a
conversation with 1\{rs. Hansen:
She said, "\V ell, we are having some family
trouble about it. \V e just decided we can't take
it and we ·would like to \\-ithdraw. Will you le1
us out of it~"
And I told her it was not as simple as that,
that the agent had performed the services in finding a buyer and that when that was done, I had
then become obligated to pay a real estate comnlission of $750, and that I was not about to stand
that loss and pay the extra costs of re-selling it.
I told her further that other agents who had
been bringing people to see the house, I had told
them it had been sold, and told them not to bother
to bring any further custon1ers ; that I had told
l\fr. \Y ebber to cancel the listing, told him I had
1nade arrangenwnts. that it would be extreinely
inconvenient and bothersmne for Ine to start all
over again for a sale.

I told her that I did not know when or what
kind of a deal T ('Ould get for a resale. I 1night
R<'ll it for n1ore or less. "'e did not lmow. There
is the po~~ibilit~· W<' might lutn:) to take a lot less.
J would n~:-:ullw that loss, that I would stand that
Jo~s. and I would hold her responsible for it. Tr.
~0-22 through 81-10.
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He in no way attempted to advise the defendants
as an attorney, as inaccurately and unfairly suggested by
this Court's opinion. In fact, defendants had an attroney
but refused to disclose the name of this attorney to
plaintiffs so that plaintiffs could discuss the matter
with him. Up to the time of performance of the contract,
February 7, the plaintiffs repeatedly urged the defendants to perform, and it was only after refusal on the
part of the defendants to either perform or discuss the
matter, that on February 8 the plaintiffs commenced
action against the defendants to recover damages and to
clear the title. The complaint of the plaintiffs states at
Paragraph 3 :
Defendants paid to Holt Realty and Investment Company the sum of $50.00 to apply upon
the purchase price of said property, and said
$50.00 is held in trust by Holt Realty and Investment Company to be applied pursuant to order of
this court. (Emphasis added)
The finding of the trial court that the plaintiffs did not
elect to retain the earnest money in lieu of damages
is in accord both with the facts of the case and is in
accord with the well-known principle that the law d<ws
not require one to do a useless act. It is also in accord
with common sense business practices. It is contrary to
such practices to require that a person say for example,
"You have paid me $100.00 earnest money and have now
breached your contract damaging me in the sum of
$1,000.00. Here is your $100.00 back. I will now ~uP you
to try and get the $100.00 back plus an additional

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

22
$900.00." It is reasonable to say, "You have paid me
$100.00 in earnest money and have breached your con-

tract, damaging me in the su1n of $1,000.00. Your $100.00
now constitutes a set off against your obligation of
$1,000.00. Now pay me $900.00 for the balance of my

damage.'' The view of this transaction as taken by the
Supreme Court is not only an unrealistic method of
transacting business but it puts an impossible burden
on the seller especially in a situation where he does not
know the financial circumstances surrounding his buyer
or his credit reputation, and will not know whether he
will ever recover his damages or not. It leaves the seller
in a position where he must, before selling his property,
cmnpute the amount which he will be damaged should
the sale fail and require that amount of earnest money
of every prospective purchaser.
Such is not the purpose of earnest money. Earnest
money is not a n1easure of the amount of money the
purchaser is going to risk on a transaction as urged by
the defendants. X or should earnest money be confused
with the price paid for an option to purchase. Earnest
mon<'y is dt>fined as follows:
"The payn1ent of a part of tl1e price of goods
sold or the deliYPry of part of such goods, for
the }JIIrpos(' of binding the contract. A token or
ph'dgP passing between the parties b:- way of
Pvid('JH'(\ or ratification of the sale." Black's Law
Dictionary, 3rd Ed., P. 635. (E1nphasis added)
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The holding of the Supreme Court that plaintiffs
had elected to retain the earnest money received as liquidated damages for the breach of the contract, contrary
to the findings of fact of the trial court, has converted
this earnest money receipt and offer to purchase, which
has been prepared by the Securities Commission and
approved by the Utah Attorney General, as a binding
contract, into a mere option to purchase, and has removed
all binding effect from the contract.
Defendants in their brief on appeal have cited to
this court many cases which have precluded a seller in
a contract providing for liquidated damages, frmn suing
for additional damages in addition to, or in lieu of
retaining the liquidated damages. None of the cases cited
by defendants involve contracts with provisions like the
one in this case. The clause by which defendants here
seek to avoid their legal obligations is as follows:
In the event the purchaser fails to pay the
balance of the said purchase price or complete
said purchase as herein provjded the amounts
paid hereon shall at the option of the seller be
retained as liquidated and agreed damages. ( I~m
phasis added)
In Royer v. Carter 233 P2d 539 (Cal. l!):ll) a contrad
with a very similar provision was considered. This contract provided :
Should the purchaser fail to pay the balance
of the purchase price, or fail to complete t hP
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purchase as herein provided, the amounts paid
hereon may at the option of the seller, be retained
as a consideration for the execution of this agreeInent by the seller. (Emphasis added)
A comparison of these two provisions reveals very few
differences. The defendants in Royer v. Carter made the
sa1ne contention as made in the instant case: the plaintiff
had an option to retain the down payment instead of
suing for damages and that the option was exercised
by retaining the deposit. The Supreme Court of California held at 233 P2d 539, 541:
The retention of the deposit was not, however, inconsistent with plaintiffs right to elect to
hold the defendant responsible for damages. Independently of any right she may have had under
the option clause itself ... plaintiff had the alternative right to retain the do"\\'ll payment as a
set off against her actual da1nages ... Her retention of the n1oney was consistent with the choice of
either re1nedy. And she informed defendant of
her intention to hold defendant liable for actual
da1nages if the latter did not perform the contract,
and since her eonduet was not inconsistent with
the eleetion of that re1nedv the trial eourt was
justified in finding that t11e ·"deposit was retained
by her to apply on dmnages sustained by reason
of defendant's breaeh of contract.··
The defendant in the R o!IC r case also contended that she
entered into the contract thinking she could forfeit her
down payn1ent and be relieved of further liability. As in
the instant case the trial court specifically found that
the defendant did not enter into the contract under that
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impression, and its holding was upheld by the California
Supreme Court. The court therefore upheld the trial
court's award to the plaintiff of the di'fference between
!he contract price and the price at which the property

was resold, plus the expenses incurred .in connection U'ith
the second sale, less the amount of the down puymellf.
These damages included the sales commission on the
second sale. The Royer case, therefore, is strikingl:'
similar to the instant case both in fact and in procedural
aspects.
Gattuccio v. Kallam 314 P2d 178 (Cal. 1957) was also
a similar situation. The buyer there had paid $10,000.00
as a deposit, the agreement also providing that in the
event the buyers failed to complete the purchase, thn
$10,000.00 could be retained by the seller at the seller's
option. The sellers proved that they were damaged in
the sum of $18,000.00 and the buyer contended that the
seller had elected to receive the $10,000.00 deposit as
full damages. The court, citing Royer v. Carter, supra,
made the following holding which is fully applicable to
the instant case:

Independently of any rights he may have had
under the option clause itself, plaintiff had the
alternative right to retain the down payment as
a set off against her actual damages.
Some of the issues in Sheffield /). Paul P. Stone
Inc., 98 F. 2d 250 (C.A. D.C. 1938), are identical with
the case at hand and some of the issues are completely
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different because the case arises out of an entirely different procedural situation and because of important
differences in the facts. Sheffield v. Stone involves a
::;uit by a defaulting purchaser to recover a $500.00 earnest deposit on a real estate contract. The contract in
that case provided that the earnest money deposit might
be forfeited at the option of the seller, or that the seller
1night avail himself of any other legal or equitable rights
under the contract. The case differs in an important
respect frmn the present case in that the record there
indicates that the house was sold to a third party after
the buyers' breach, for a sum in excess of the contract
price, but the record does not show whether it was the
gross price or the net price which exceeded the contract
price. Nine· months after the plaintiffs' repudiation of
the contract, six 1nonths after the sale of the house to
a third party, and two months after the plaintiffs haJ
demanded the return of the deposit, action was brought
hr the defaulting buyers to recover the earnest money.
The first issue involved was whether such retention
of the earnest 1noney by the seller eonstituted an exercise of the seller's option to forfeit the deposit. The court
defined forfeiture of the deposit to 1nean "keep it as
liquidated damages and call the contract off." The contentions of the parties were just opposite to the eontentions in the present rase. The seller contended that the
retention of the earnest nwney constituted an exercise
of the option to forfeit the earnest nwney and the defaulting hu)·ers contended that the retention of the earn-
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est money did not amount to an exercise of the option
to forfeit the earnest money. The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that the
retention of the earnest money was not an exercise of
the option to forfeit the earnest money and did not
preclude the sellers from claiming actual damages ( a8
determined by the difference between the contract price
and the price at which the property was sold to third
parties less the expenses of the second sale to third
parties). The court stated at page 252:
When plaintiffs' breach occurred two alternative remedies, apart from a suit for specific
performance, were open to defendants: (1) to
"forfeit" the deposit, i.e. to retain it as liquidated
damages and call the deal off; ( 2) to establish
the actual damages by selling the house to third
persons, and hold plaintiffs for the damages so
established. Defendants chose the second course.
Their letter of December 30 expressed that choice
plainly. They had never expressed, and apparently had never formed, an intention to "forfeit"
the deposit as liquidated damages. They not only
expressed an intention to collect actual damages
but procce:Ied to fix their amount, if any, by a
resale of the house. We think they thereby availed
themselves of "legal or equitable rights" under
the contract so as to preclude them, by a fair
interpretation of the option clause, from electing
to forfeit the deposit, i.e. to clain1 it as liquidated
damages. They cannot be permitted to make their
choice between liquidated and actual damages
after they have determined which are the greater;
for the intent of the option clause is not to give
them that advantage, but to make it unnecessary
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for them to ascertain actual damages.
Since the sellers were not making claim or counterclaim to recover damages, and since it appears from
the record that the actual damages did not equal or
exceed the amount of the deposit, this case does not involve either by holding or by dictum the question presented by a situation where the actual damages do exceed
the amount of the deposit. The court remanded the case
for further hearing to determine the amount of the actual
damages, and held that the seller could retain actual
damages, and that the defaulting purchaser could not
recover the earnest 1uoney payment unless and only to
the extent that it exceeded actual damages.
X either defendant nor the Court's opinion cite any
authority inconsistent with the above, and plaintiffs'
research has revealed no cases on the smne or sinrilar
facts, inconsistent with those above.
POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN REVERSING THE JUDGMENT
SINCE IN SO DOING IT REVERSED THE TRIAL COURT'S
JUDGMENT QUIETING TITLE IN PLAINTIFFS AND RESPONDENTS AS AGAINST DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

The defendants gained equitable title to plaintiffs'
property by virhtP of the agree1nent since it is an agreelnent which is subject to an action for specific performance. It wa~ neressar~~. if for nothing else, to bring an
action to quiet title since defendants failed and refused
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to discuss the matter with plaintiffs after repeated demands. Defendants refused to meet with the plaintiffs
to resolve the difficulties, and even refused to divulge
the name of their attorney to plaintiffs for a negotiated
settlement, and therefore clouded plaintiffs title by their
equitable interest in the property.
As stated by this Court's opinion the award of attorney's fees is conditioned upon the necessity for incurring them and upon the plaintiffs being justified in
their demands. The award of attorney's fees in the instant case is justified by the necessity of a quiet title
action alone.
POINT IV
IF LOSS OF AN ADVANTAGEOUS BARGAIN IS NO
LONGER A PROPER MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR
BREACH OF A CONTRACT TO PURCHASE REAL ESTATE,
THE CASE SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL
TO CORRECTLY ASSESS DAMAGES UNDER A CORRECT
MEASURE AS SET OUT BY THIS COURT.

This action is a legal action for damages for breach
of contract, an ancient right firmly established in AngloAmerican law. Breach of contract for sale of real estate
occurs under many highly varied circu1nstances and various rules have been announced to fit the various circumstances of different cases. In cases such as the instant
case many respectable authorities including the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah have held the measure of
damages to be "loss of an advantageous bargain." Per-
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kins v. Spencer 121 Utah 468, 243 P2d 446, 451, held:

The vendors are entitled to any loss occasioned them by any of these factors : ( 1) Loss of
an .advantageous bargain; (2) any damage to or
depreciation of the property; (3) any decline in
value due to change in market value of the property not allowed in items numbers 1 and 2; and
(4) for the fair rental value of the property during the period of occupancy. (Emphasis added)
The Supreme Court in Cole v. Parker 5 Utah 2d 263,
300 P2d 623, quoted the foregoing as the rule of damages
and held that the plaintiff in that case could recover
the difference between the contract price and the price
for which he could sell the property. See also Royer z:.
Carter and Gattucio ·v. Kallam, supra.
Undisputed testimony at the trial showed the plaintiffs made extensive and intensive efforts to find another buyer, and were not able to sell the property except
upon terms less advantageous than the Hansen contract,
to the plaintiffs' substantial loss.
Plaintffs have sought and now seek only legal compensatory dan1ages to restore this loss caused by defendants'
breach of contract. Plaintiffs and the trial court proceeded upon the theory that loss of an advantageous
bargain was the proper means of ascertaining just compensatory da1nages for the breach of this contract. The
plaintiffs still believe that this is the true n1easure of
da1nages appropriate to this case. However, the main
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opinion of this Court appears to overrule the pronouncement of Cole vs. Parker and

Perkin~ 'US.

Spencer, supra,
as to the measure of damages. If in fact loss of an advantageous bargain is no longer a proper measure of
damages for breach of a contract to purchase real estate
and the plaintiffs and the trial court were in error in
following this theory, the Supren1e Court in this appeal
should not reverse the trial court but should remand
the case to be properly tried under a correct measure
of damages as defined by this Court. Plaintiffs therefore
urge the Court (1) to affirm the judgment of the trial
court awarding damages for loss of an advantageous
bargain or (2) if the cases of Cole v. Parker and Perkin ..,
v. Spencer, supra, are no longer the law, to give the
plaintiffs opportunity to prove their loss under a correct
measure of damages.

In the rehearing a clarification should also be made
as to the degree of proof regarding damages in a civil
action. The main opinion of the Supreme Court appear::;
to upset well-established principles as to degree of proof,
requiring a party in a civil suit for legal damages to
prove his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence.
For example, the opinion states that there was ''no certainty" that it was necessary to include the refrigerator
in the second sale. The evidence is clear and uncontradicted that it was necessary to include the refrigerator.
Is a preponderance of evidence still sufficient, or must
the plaintiff now establish each item of damages with
"certainty" 1 Also, plaintiffs' evidence contained much
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uncontradicted testinwny and evidence as to the reasonable Inarket value of the property. The Court stated
that the plaintiffs' evidence was not "conclusive." Is it
necessary that each item of damage in an action for
legal damages be proved "conclusively" or is proof by
preponderance sufficient~

COXCLeSIOX
For the reasons set forth the plaintiffs and respondents respectfully submit that the record fully supports
the findings of the trial court and its judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs and respondents, and respectfully requests the Court to grant a rehearing and affirm the
findings and judgment of the trial court, or in the alternative, remand the case to the trial court for the purpose of correctly assessing da1nages consistent with
proper instructions of this Court.
Respectfully submitted,

JOHN H. ALLEK
Attorney for Plai;utiffs and
Re,..,·pondents
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